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failure" (Williamson, 1975) are widely accepted, the
reasons behind that failure are not. On one side of the
debate are those who argue that the change resulted from
the greater efficiencies of administered hierarchies
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; Williamson and Ouchi,
1981a,b). On the other side are those who argue that the
change resulted from the use and abuse of economic and
political power by large corporations (Perrow, 1981a,b).
The market failures debate is germane to IS-enabled
knowledge management (KM) research for several
reasons. First, the success of IS-enabled KM tools may be
significantly linked to underlying characteristics of
market-based and administered coordination structures.
Second, the market failures debate has not only examined
the nature of those characteristics, but has contributed to
information systems research relevant to KM study and
practice. Third, the debate links organizational structure
and culture–two factors of interest in the KM literature
(Wiig, 1995; Davenport and Prusak, 1998; Alavi and
Leidner, 1999). Finally, the debate highlights the potential
for knowledge exchange abuse.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the application
of the market failures debate to the realm of knowledge
management. The above reasons suggest this debate may
provide critical theoretical grounding for future
knowledge management research. To this end, these two
opposing perspectives are coupled into a model that
highlights important variables and relationships, thus
providing a guide to future knowledge management
support systems (KMSS) investigations. Our model is
developed as follows. First, we lay a theoretical
foundation for the framework by briefly summarizing the
market failures debate, then drawing connections to
current issues in knowledge management. Second, we
incorporate those dimensions identified in the first part of
the paper into a model for KMSS research.

Abstract
"Knowledge markets" have been proposed as an
organizational structure to promote knowledge
exchange for increased organizational profitability and
survivability. However, the economics and
organizational behavior literatures in administered
hierarchies suggest that knowledge markets and their
component reward systems could suffer from a variety
of abuses, inequities, and inefficiencies. These
literatures, and the information systems investigations
they have spawned, are parlayed into a model for
knowledge management research.

Introduction
Facilitating effective and efficient knowledge sharing
among organizational members is a primary objective of
organizational knowledge management research and
practice. To this end, Davenport and Prusak propose that
knowledge–much like other products and services–can be
traded in markets. They argue that organizational
knowledge markets offer a fair and efficient coordination
mechanism for knowledge exchange because price
structures within those markets facilitate the evaluation of
risks and rewards between knowledge "buyers" and
"sellers." In turn, efficient and effective knowledge
exchanges increase the potential for organizational
profitability and long-term viability (Davenport and
Prusak, 1998).
In contrast to Davenport and Prusak's marketcentered approach, Nonaka (1994) argues that middle
managers should administer and coordinate knowledge
exchange. Their crucial position at "the intersection of the
vertical and horizontal flows of information in the
company" allows middle managers to combine "strategic,
macro, universal information" from strategic
organizational levels with the "hands-on, micro, specific
information" from operational levels. Nonaka concludes
that middle managers are "the true 'knowledge engineers'
of the knowledge creating organization" (p. 32).
The two opposing views over an optimal knowledge
exchange coordination structure are reminiscent of a
similar competition between market-based and
administered coordination structures during the late 19th
and early 20th Centuries. At that time large verticallyintegrated corporations such as Carnegie Steel, Standard
Oil, and Sears and Roebuck displaced many wholesalerretailer supply chains. Though the results of this "market

Theoretical Foundation
The market failures debate is relevant to knowledge
management research because the two sides have
forwarded theories that have been used in the design of
IS-enabled tools that can be adopted for knowledge
management. On one side is Williamson's work on
transaction costs. It was based on Coase's (1937) model of
the firm, and later served as a foundation for Malone's
(1987) model of coordination structures. Malone et al.
(1987) used that model to argue that information systems
could reduce transaction costs to the point that market
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structures would be more efficient than administered
structures. They extended that argument to predict that
this change in cost structures would reverse the past trend
of substituting markets for hierarchies. On the other side
of the debate, Perrow extended his early work on task
(Perrow, 1967) to the relationship between task and the
distribution of organizational power. His line of research
served as a foundation for Poole's (1978) information-task
model, which was used in turn by DeSanctis and Gallupe
(1987) in their development of a framework for group
decision support systems (GDSS).
The market failures debate concerns underlying
theories about the transition from market to administered
structures in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Those in the
transaction cost perspective camp (e.g., Williamson,
1975) argue that the primary reason that large
organizations arose was due to their ability to mitigate
problems of uncertainty and bounded rationality inherent
in large markets. These organizations pursued strategies
of vertical integration, instituting multidivisional
administrative hierarchies to manage the resulting
complexity. Administered hierarchies permitted lower
search and bargaining costs, thus enhancing efficiency
and competitiveness in retail markets. Proponents of this
position suggest that efficiency is a key factor, and that
transaction frequency, uncertainty and costs are the
variables of greatest concern.
In opposition to the transaction cost approach, those
in the power perspective (e.g., Perrow, 1981a,b) argue
that the change from markets to hierarchies was due
primarily to the ability of large organizations to acquire
and exert economic power. According to this viewpoint,
those large firms used their tremendous economic power
to "force communities and workers to bear [costs] and not
having [those costs] reflected in the price of the goods and
services" (Perrow, 1981a: 372). Proponents of this
perspective argue that research and practice should
concern the control of organizational power. Although
legal and political remedies are often forwarded, the
perspective also acknowledges the crucial role of
organizational culture in shifting and maintaining
organizational structures. Perrow (1981a: 386) advocates
organizational structures based on "communal efforts
with norms of other-regarding behavior" rather than
markets "where there is more concern with opportunism"
and hierarchies "which are predicated upon the fear of
autonomy." Surprisingly, Williamson (in Williamson and
Ouchi, 1981a) also mirrors some of these sentiments to
some degree, acknowledging that "clan-type management
styles" can leverage socialization processes to enhance
efficiency.
The market failures debate provides useful theories
on the influence of power and transaction cost on
organizational structure. In the past, those theories have
provide concepts and constructs useful to several streams
of IS research. Those streams appear especially relevant
to KMSS research and practice.

IS Research and its Roots in the Market
Failures Debate
An examination of those research streams that were
rooted in the market failures debate and have flowered in
IS domain can provide a set of variables and relationships
for KMSS research. Variables and relationships from
those streams will now be identified and linked within a
model for the study of KMSS.

Task, Organizational Power, and IS Research
Perrow (1967) noted that technology, which he
defined as “the actions that an individual performs upon
an object, with or without the aid of tools or mechanical
devices, in order to make some changes in that object” (p.
195), must be carried out in the midst of human
interactions. Whether those objects are raw materials,
symbols, or even other individuals, the form those
interactions take are the organization’s structures. When
technology is placed in an organizational context, those
actions will primarily consist of tasks of "work imposed
by a person in authority or an employer or by
circumstance" (Webster's).
In refining his framework, Perrow argued that control
and coordination form the two dimensions of task
structure. Control can be further decomposed into task
discretion and resource mobilization. Coordination can
entail planning or negotiation. Of these two dimensions,
Perrow (1979) argued that control is the more important
dimension, especially concerning the use (and abuse) of
organizational power.
Perrow’s framework provided a seminal foundation
for later research. Van de Ven and Delbecq (1974)
extended Perrow's (1967) analysis to formulate a taskcontingent model of work-unit structure based upon task
difficulty and task variability. Task difficulty corresponds
to "the degree of complexity of the search process in
performing the task, the amount of thinking time required
to solve work-related problems, and the body of
knowledge that provides guidelines for performing the
tasks." Task variability corresponds to "the number of
exceptional cases encountered in the work requiring
different methods or procedures for doing the work" (p.
183).
Poole (1978) applied this general framework to the
description of strategic choice in governing organizational
communication for information acquisition. He
considered two variables of communication structure: the
structures of the communication network and the
mechanisms of information evaluation and integration. He
revived Perrow's concerns about the use of organizational
power by examining its dependence upon communication
structure.
Poole began by extending Van de Ven and Delbecq's
task-contingent model with Thompson's (1967) concept of
task interdependence. He then applied that extension to
communication structure. This information task model
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differentiates markets from organizations on the basis of
decision rules and transactions. Individuals make
decisions, and can delegate decision-making authority to
their subordinates within organizational structures.
Organizations can thus be defined as "a set of people
logically ordered by decision rules" (p. 1483). Markets,
on the other hand, are not decision-making units–they are
arenas of exchange transactions.
Malone (1987) drew upon Baligh's (1986) distinction
in his investigation of the relationship between task, task
processors, task processor managers, and organizational
coordination structures. Given the scope of transaction
costs, Malone (1987:1319) identified three costs
associated with coordination structures: production costs,
coordination costs, and vulnerability costs. Production
costs include “the costs of production capacity and the
costs of delays in processing tasks.” Coordination costs
include “the costs of maintaining communication links (or
‘channels’) between actors and the costs of exchanging
‘messages’ along these links.” Vulnerability costs include
“the unavoidable costs of a changed situation that are
incurred before the organization can adapt to a new
situation.” Malone showed that trade-offs between
production cost and governance cost economies can be
framed in the context of transaction costs. Conclusions
from that line of research were further explored in Malone
et al. (1987) work on information technology and
coordination structure choice. It hypothesized that the
increased use of information technology could reduce
coordination costs associated with task coordination, thus
leading to a greater use of market structures.
Malone et al.'s (1987) prediction for increased market
structures can be seen as a theoretical support for
knowledge exchange markets. However, orthogonal to
that view is the cultural viewpoint that predicts a very
different form of organizational structure. This second
viewpoint originates in Williamson's acknowledgement of
the importance of task variation in determining risktaking behaviors in groups engaged in unrelated,
common, and integrated sets of tasks. Peer groups have an
advantage over markets when those groups are engaged in
a common task or an integrated set of tasks because group
members are better able to discern "requisite attributes"
for group admission and to monitor for inefficient or
unwanted behaviors. In addition, Williamson
acknowledged that members of peer groups involved in
common or integrated tasks could accrue "associational
benefits." These include benefits to those "who feel a
sense of responsibility to do their fair share as members of
a group" involving "a transformation of 'involvement'
relations, from a calculative to a more nearly quasimoral
mode" (p. 44).
The similarities between Williamson's "associational
benefits" and elements of organizational culture are
unmistakable. As with Perrow, culture has been
acknowledged as an important factor in organizational
structure. The importance of culture was noted by Ouchi's

was constructed upon the mediating information task
constructs of availability, uniformity, and independence.
Availability refers to perceptions of suitability and
obtainability of information. Uniformity refers to
perceptions that information requirements are consistent
in terms of amount, type, and report timing. Independence
refers to the ability of a work unit to meet its knowledge
requirements. Poole hypothesized that availability and
uniformity affected both communication network
structure and mode of information evaluation and
integration, a hypothesis we will later exploit in
concatenating the power and transaction cost
perspectives. Organizational power, on the other hand,
was hypothesized to be dependent only upon information
independence.
The task-organizational structure model is applicable
to IS-based KMSS research in at least two ways: First, it
addresses the use and abuse of power, a concern that has
continually surfaced in the knowledge management and
organizational learning literature (Brown and Duguid,
1991; Davenport and Prusak, 1998). Second, this model
conceptualizes how organizational culture could mitigate
abuse of power in knowledge exchange, especially
concerning the use of IS-based knowledge management
support systems.

Transaction Costs, Organizational Structure,
and IS Research
Coase (1937) investigated the increased use of
hierarchical supervisor-subordinate relationships in turnof-the-century organizations. He argued that
entrepreneurs could avoid significant costs and risks
associated with the extended use of markets by instituting
long-term employee labor contracts. It is this "system of
relationships which comes into existence when the
direction of resources is dependent upon an entrepreneur"
that for Coase constitutes the firm.
Williamson (1975) extended Coase's argument by
detailing the strengths and limitations of hierarchies and
markets. He constructed an "organizational failures
framework" from three sets of conditions. Economic
conditions were described with Coase's use of transaction
costs, risk, and contractual relations. Human conditions
were described via bounded rationality and opportunism–
which Williamson defined as "self-interest seeking with
guile" (p. 26). Environmental conditions were described
by uncertainty and small-numbers exchange. These
conditions determined the transaction cost of an
organizational structure, and it was the responsibility of
the entrepreneur to choose the most cost-efficient
structure.
At this point the transaction cost perspective can be
divided into technology and culture paths. The technology
path diverges with Baligh's (1986) reexamination of the
markets versus hierarchies debate. Concluding that
Williamson's work is "clearly about hybrids of hierarchies
and markets" in organizations (p. 1489), Baligh
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Like GDSS research, KMSS research may investigate
features that mitigate unwanted behaviors. Like electronic
communications research, KMSS research may
investigate technologies that reduce the time and expense
of coordinating knowledge acquisition, organization, and
communication tasks. Thus, KMSS research not only has
practical advantages in providing useful tools for
organizations, it can also shed light on a long-standing
academic debate.
We can now begin the task of unifying the power and
transaction cost perspectives into an integrated
framework. Task, coordination structure, and culture
constitute the major subsections of the framework. Power
and transaction costs, the variables of interest, are
positioned at the intersection of the three subsections.
These components are displayed below in Figure 1.
One key point that must be addressed in the
unification of power and cost perspectives is the different
levels of analysis: Poole's model is set at the work unit
level, while Malone's work is at the organizational. This
might ordinarily mean that the two are quite distinct, until
it is recognized that Poole's hypothesis that independence
is a cornerstone of organizational power implies power
flows across networks within organizational structures.
When Poole's work unit level power hypothesis is
projected across organization level networks, two
organization level variables result: power flows and
power differentials.
It is through these variables that Poole's and Malone's
work can be joined and a unified framework for KMSS
research can be constructed. In this way, Poole's
dimensions of availability, uniformity, and independence
help explain distributions of power. More specifically,
they help identify power sources and sinks. When
overlaid upon the hierarchies and markets in Malone's
studies, the two perspectives can be interlinked.
The final component of the KMSS model is
organizational culture, whose importance has been
recognized by both sides of the debate: Perrow in his
reflections on the abuse of organizational power,
Williamson in his references to "atmosphere" and
"collective spirit" (pp. 58, 77) and in his work with Ouchi
concerning the differentiation of "hard" and "soft"
organizational contracting. Culture serves to balance
power, and consists of the final variable in our model.
Culture also facilitates socialization, guiding the way in
which novitiates become members of a community of
practice. In this way, our model incorporates suggestions
from the knowledge management and organizational
learning research promoting the social construction and
transfer of knowledge (Senge, 1990; Brown and Duguid,
1991; Resnick et al., 1991; Davenport and Prusak, 1998).
The KMSS research model is displayed below in
Figure 2. It is admittedly large in comparison to most
models used for experimental or theoretical intents.
However, our objective is not to formulate a concise
model for specific KMSS investigations or designs, but

(1980) study of transaction efficiency between
cooperating individuals. Ouchi extended Williamson's
organizational failures framework by noting that "when
tasks become highly unique, completely integrated, or
ambiguous for other reasons" (p. 134), both markets and
bureaucracies could be expected to fail due to difficulties
in constructing fair and equitable standards of individual
performance. Ouchi proposed that the greater use of
socialization in organizations would not only achieve
improvements in efficiency by mitigating inconsistencies
between individual and organizational goals, but also
delegate a significant portion of performance evaluation
from the manager to the work group. This transfer of
performance evaluation in effect creates a different type
of organizational structure, which Ouchi dubbed the
"clan."
While the transaction cost perspective provides
alternative possibilities of organizational structure, it not
only emphasizes the relationship between task and
organizational structure but also gives credence to
Perrow's power perspective. Leveraging this common
ground allows the two perspectives to be coupled, which
provides a wealth of KMSS research possibilities. We
now examine how those divergent perspectives can be
inter-linked within a model to ground those research
possibilities within this longstanding theoretical debate.

A Model for KMSS Research
The opposing theories of market-to-administration
shifts are germane to knowledge management because
they can help guide predictions on alternative knowledge
management support systems. Relevant questions include
the following: What is the significance of organizational
power and transaction costs in knowledge markets? To
what extent do variations in organizational power and
transaction costs induce shifts from knowledge markets to
administered allocations? What is the role of culture in
the use of organizational power in knowledge
management programs? Under what conditions will both
knowledge markets and hierarchies fail, and be ultimately
replaced by a "clan" structure based on cultural values?
Under what conditions do markets, hierarchies, and clans
coexist within an organization's knowledge management
program(s)? To what extent will organizations hybridize
market, hierarchical, and clan structures in knowledge
management programs?
KMSS research can exploit these and other questions
derived from Perrow's and Williamson's works to guide
the design, application, and use of IS-enabled KMSS
tools. Poole's model can provide guidance on the
relationships among knowledge tasks, communication
networks, and organizational power; Malone's work on
coordination theory and Ouchi's work on the influence of
organizational culture guide the set of organizational
structures that those communication networks are likely
to take.
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Perrow, C. "A Framework for the Comparative Analysis
of Organizations," American Sociological Review (32:2),
1967, pp. 194-208.

rather to inspire debate and inquiry. In that sense our
model should be seen as a resource of theoreticallygrounded variables and relationships that can be drawn
upon and individualized for future research.

Perrow, C. Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 2nd
edition, Scott, Foresman and Company, Glenview, IL,
1979.

Conclusions
Knowledge management research and practice is
exploring the development and use of IS-enabled tools to
facilitate knowledge acquisition, sharing, and storing.
Rigorous research in this domain must be well-grounded
in theory. Our work here identifies important variables
and relationships from the economics and organizational
structure domains, and then presents those variables and
relationships in a model prototype. Future research can
draw upon our model as a first step toward the
development of models for study and implementation.
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Figure 1. A Framework for KMSS Research
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Figure 2. A Model for the Study of Knowledge Management Support Systems
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